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Government interest has increased in recent years regarding the viability of 
contracting out for the Life-Cycle Support of military weapon systems.  This thesis 
addresses the legal ramifications and possible contracting avenues that Program 
Managers could use to obtain support for Army tactical missile systems.  Congress has 
enacted numerous statutes that the Program Manager must adhere to regarding depot 
maintenance activities when considering Life-Cycle Contractor Support.   
Within the Program Executive Office (PEO), Tactical Missiles, two programs 
have received approval for contracting out support efforts.  One program awarded a 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The research paper studies the various ways of contracting for logistical support 
throughout the life cycle of an Army tactical missile system and presents lessons learned 
from major Army weapon systems.  It presents the backgrounds of the Department of 
Defense logistical environment, contracting approaches utilized by various systems, and 
lessons learned by the programs from the process of gaining approval of their support 
concepts.  Additionally, it incorporates the financial aspects of funding contractor life 
cycle support into the contracting options available for program managers of Army 
tactical missile systems. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported to Congress concerning the 
Army’s poor management of supporting weapon systems subsequent to fielding.  The 
report led to the Department of Defense (DoD) investigation into numerous ways to 
reduce the increasing costs associated with the operations and sustainment of fielded 
weapon systems and identified ten pilot programs to implement Life Cycle Contractor 
Support (LCCS) strategies.  The current Acquisition Reform environment provides 
opportunities for contractors to develop, manufacture, and sustain systems throughout 
their life cycle.  The first Army program to attempt a LCCS approach was unsuccessful in 
gaining approval by Army leadership.  However, two programs within the Program 
Executive Office (PEO), Tactical Missiles, obtained approval and are currently either 
contracting for or initiating contract efforts for LCCS.  Both the Air Force and Navy 
embraced LCCS efforts and can potentially provide roadmaps for Army efforts.  The 
2 
proposed research incorporates this information to provide alternatives available for 
LCCS pertaining to Army tactical missiles. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What various contracting opportunities exist to provide Life Cycle Contractor 
Support (LCCS) for Army tactical missile systems?   
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. Why Does LCCS Interest the DoD and the Army? 
b. Does the System’s Life Cycle Determine a Specific Contract 
Method?  
c. What Does the Army Contract For In This Environment?  
d. What Contractor Incentives Are Possible To Improve 
Performance? 
e. What Legal Ramifications Exist Regarding LCCS?  
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The thesis is a possible implementation guide for Army tactical missile systems 
only.  The study includes impacts/opportunities for missiles and their launch platforms 
relative to management by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Tactical Missiles.  It 
does not include Army helicopter or tracked vehicle platforms.  Due to the limited 
numbers of predecessors for Army LCCS, the study focuses on the Javelin weapon 
system and its endeavors to obtain LCCS approval from both the DoD and the Army. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Research consists of analyzing missile/platform logistics requirements within the 
framework of the current Acquisition Reform environment.  New DoD policies and 
guidelines exist without providing clear direction for implementing LCCS.  With this in 
mind, research involves the Congressional mandates regarding core capabilities, wartime 
constraints, surcharges, etc.  It also includes the Air Force and Navy avenues utilized for 
LCCS.  The obtained information comes from existing and/or historical contracts, 
Congressional Appropriations Laws, USC Title 10, DoD/DA policies and guidelines, 




Chapter II describes the environment associated with logistics support and, in 
broad terms, the Army’s tactical missile weapon systems along with their historical 
sustainment perspectives.  The chapter concludes with a summarization of the 
information presented. 
Chapter III consists of a discussion of the legal constraints and issues relative to 
supporting and monitoring expenditures imposed by Congress.  A description of 
sustainment issues affecting the Army relative to missiles and their launch platforms is 
provided and the chapter concludes with a summarization. 
Chapter IV presents an explanation of both actual and potential contractual 
vehicles along with lessons learned from previous attempts to gain Army approval to 
initiate LCCS.  It includes both monitoring and financial aspects required to answer 
Congressionally-imposed mandates on program managers.  A chapter summary 
completes this section. 
Chapter V, the final chapter of this thesis, summarizes the information obtained 
during the research and answers the research questions presented in Section C, above.  
The chapter ends with recommendations for further study. 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The PEO, Tactical Missile is responsible for the total life cycle efforts relative to 
Army tactical missiles and many of their launch platforms.  The proposed thesis can 
provide possible alternatives for contracting support and sustainment of their tactical 
weapon systems.  It also provides insight into the legal aspects involved with contracting 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD) established initiatives in April 1998, giving 
more responsibility to program managers for the total life cycle cost of developed 
weapon systems.  The Strom Thurman National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999 directed the Defense Department to select and report on ten (10) programs to 
Congress on the implementation efforts associated with the initiative.  DOD established 
broad goals for the reduction of weapon system’s operating and support (O&S) costs.  
DOD expected an increase in available funding for Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement projects.  The DOD goal was to experience a 
reduction of 20 to 50 percent in projected life-cycle costs by fiscal year 2000, and a 20 
percent decrease in O&S costs for fielded systems by fiscal year 2005.  (GAO, 2000) 
In September 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO), the auditing arm of 
Congress, studied the Army’s policies implemented in response to the DOD initiatives 
and reported their lack of faith in the Army’s ability to adequately reduce costs based 
upon two findings.  The first finding stated,  
The Army…[lacked accountability assignment] for O&S cost reductions 
nor [requirement establishment] that each weapon system achieve a 
specific level of cost reductions.  
GAO’s second finding stated, the Army  
…lacks complete and reliable data on the actual operating and support 
costs of the weapon systems that are being replaced.   
The deficiency of data encumbers the program managers’ efforts to credibly estimate 
O&S costs, which consequently precludes any meaningful evaluation of a project’s 
success in achieving the DOD goal.  GAO cited the Army’s budgeting process for O&S 
efforts as a reason for the lack of information regarding fielded systems, primarily 
because information systems within the Army do not maintain detailed O&S expenditure 




B. APACHE PRIME VENDOR SUPPORT EFFORTS 
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, the 
Department of Defense designated the AH-64 Apache helicopter as a pilot program to 
initiate improvements in the program management responsibility for life-cycle support of 
major weapon systems.  (GAO, 1999)  The current sustainment costs for the AH-64 are 
the most expensive in the Army and the sixth most expensive in the Defense Department.  
(Williams, 2000)  The Apache support costs represented 22% of the Army Working 
Capital Fund expenditures and comprised $50 to $60 million of the Army Materiel 
Command’s sustainment expenditures.  (Williams, 2000)  Neither the Army’s supply 
system nor the contractors for repair parts, have incentives to reduce costs or improve 
system reliability.  (Williams, 2000)  In an attempt under acquisition reform, the Program 
Manager and PEO Aviation submitted an unsolicited proposal from Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin for a prime vendor support concept.  The proposed logistics efforts 
would assume that all of the traditional efforts currently performed by Government-
managed entities, would be transferred to a contractor team designated Team Apache 
Systems.  (GAO, 1999) 
The concept raised significant issues, both financial and operational.  A primary 
issue consisted of how the Army owned parts inventory would be converted to contractor 
control while retaining Army ownership.  Another issue involved costing/funding 
questions raised by Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center, Army Audit Agency, and 
Army Comptroller.  Finally, significant impacts on the Army’s support infrastructure due 
to Apache PVS would arise, such as: pairing with existing structure, adverse impacts 
during transition to war, and limited commanders’ flexibility to meet changing funding 
needs.  (GAO, 1999) 
In 1999, the Army and Defense Department set 2001 as a milestone for 
completing all analysis and deciding whether or not to implement Apache PVS.  When 
the date was reached, the issues were not adequately resolved, and DoD refused to permit 
the Army to proceed with the plan.  The decision was based on an inability to resolve key 
issues.  The Program Manager offered to provide funding to the Army Working Capital 
Fund (AWCF) commensurate with the estimated impacts to remaining AWCF 
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participants due to Apache’s withdrawal to PVS.  The Army Comptroller turned down 
the offer.  The Corpus Christi Army Depot American Federation of Government 
employees and the contractor did not reach an agreeable position regarding work sharing 
and teaming.  Due to the large quantity of affected Government employees, an A-76 
study was conducted and eventually included the Inspector General, Army Audit Agency, 
and the General Accounting Office.  Because of these issues, Army leadership sought 
other systems to use as pilot programs and turned to the Program Executive Office 
(PEO), Tactical Missiles to offer projected programs – preferably systems that had not 
entered the Army Working Capital Fund infrastructure.  (Williams, 2000) 
C. ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEMS 
The Program Executive Office, Tactical Missiles is responsible for the 
management of Army tactical missile systems.  PEO responsibilities include:   
Army centralized manager for assigned programs reporting directly to the 
Army Acquisition Executive; provide overall direction and guidance for 
the development, acquisition, testing, production, product improvements, 
fielding and sustainment; place primary management emphasis and 
oversight on total life cycle cost, schedule, and performance while 
ensuring compliance with applicable national policies such as 
environmental protection and socio-economic programs; and maintain a 
total Army perspective in managing assigned programs and keep the 
Senior Army Leadership fully apprised of program status, to include 
problems which could affect the Army’s ultimate commitment to the 
program.  (PEO TM Weapon Systems Book, 2002)   
Oversight is provided for the following weapons systems:  Improved Target Acquisition 
System, Multiple Launch Rocket System, High Mobility Artillary Rocket System 
(HIMARS), Army Tactical Missile System, Longbow HELLFIRE Missile System, 2.75 
inch Rocket System, Common Missile System, JAVELIN Weapon System, Kinetic 
Energy Missile System, and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System.  A more in-
depth discussion of the programs follows. 
D. MISSILE SYSTEMS AND LAUNCH PLATFORMS 
Missiles are most frequently considered “wooden” rounds not requiring periodic 
maintenance or support.  Fielding consists of delivery to a missile storage facility or 
depot.  Removal only occurs with unit deployment or for training firings.  Launch 
platform utilization is much heavier and results in requirements for spares, repair parts, 
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petroleum, lubricants, and software upgrades.  If the program manager has responsibility 
for the launch platform, it becomes the focus of O&S cost reduction efforts because it is 
the primary cost driver during the sustainment phase of the weapon system’s life.  (GAO, 
2000)  
Due to the DOD initiatives to reduce O&S costs, many programs are analyzing 
types of maintenance support as a means to reduce costs.  Two basic forms of support 
exist:  organic – support/maintenance performed by soldiers; and contracted – a 
contractor, usually the system developer, performs efforts normally conducted by 
soldiers.  Various mixtures can exist between the three levels of direct support, general 
support, or depot maintenance.  DOD refers to these categories as Organization 
Maintenance (support performed at the operational site), Intermediate Maintenance (tasks 
performed by mobile, semi-mobile, and/or fixed specialized organizations and 
installations), and Depot Maintenance (the highest level of maintenance that supports 
efforts above and beyond the capabilities of Intermediate Maintenance).  (Blanchard, 
1992)  This thesis concentrates on the depot maintenance level for support and the 
methods to contract for the effort.  Three programs within PEO, Tactical Missiles were 
provided to DOD as pilots to implement Life Cycle Contracted Support concepts.  Others 
may follow if these three prove successful. 
1. Systems Organically Supported 
Within the PEO, Tactical Missile family of systems, the TOW Ground Support 
System, the Longbow HELLFIRE, 2.75 inch Rocket, and the M270 Multiple Launch 
Rocket System (MLRS) receive organic support.  The launch mechanisms require 
support since the missiles are designated wooden rounds. 
The AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopter utilizes the Longbow HELLFIRE 
missile to provide the capability to engage targets in both day and night, adverse weather 
conditions, and with battlefield obscurants present.  The Longbow HELLFIRE 
complements the semi-active Laser HELLFIRE missile by offering fire-and-forget 
capability against a given target set.  The missile consists of a radio frequency guidance 
section that provides both lock-on before launch (LOBL) and lock-on after launch 
(LOAL).  (DOD, 2001) 
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Figure 2-1. Longbow HELLFIRE Missile from the AH-64D helicopter. 
 
The M270 Launcher also receives organic support.  This system is a multi-
national enterprise between the United States Army, Great Britain, Germany, France, and 
Italy, and also serves several additional FMS customers.  The system fires a MLRS 
Family of Munitions (MFOM) such as the MLRS rocket, Extended Range MLRS rocket, 
Guided MLRS rocket, and several variants of the Army Tactical Missile System.  Red 
River Army Depot provides depot-related support services for the system.  (DOD, 2001) 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Multiple Launch Rocket System.  
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2. Systems With Approved Life-Cycle Contractor Support 
Systems within the PEO family that obtained approval for Life Cycle Contractor 
Support are the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the Improved Target 
Acquisition System (ITAS), and the Javelin system.  The first is a guided missile, the 
second is a target acquisition system used with the TOW missile, and the last is a 
shoulder-fired missile with a command launch unit. 
The ATACMS Block II system provides deep fires to Army Objective Force and 
Joint Forces Commanders to delay and disrupt threat-armored forces at ranges in excess 
of 100 kilometers.  The missile has a low sustainment costs since it is considered a 
certified round due to having a predictable and acceptable level of reliability over a 
specified certification period.  The system was battle-proven during Desert Storm.  
(DOD, 2001) 
 
Figure 2-3. Army Tactical Missile System. 
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The ITAS evolved out of the combat-proven Ground TOW System and provides 
for both a passive and active laser ranging, a second-generation forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR) sight, improved direct-view optics, an aided target tracker, embedded training 
capability, and built-in-test diagnostics.  These enhancements provide a significant 
improvement in the probability of hit and a dramatic improvement in target detection 
over the previous Ground TOW sighting system.  (CCMS, 2002) 
The Javelin system is a medium range, imaging infrared, fire-and-forget, 
manportable antitank weapon system developed by the U.S. Army and the U. S. Marine 
Corps.  Javelin satisfies an operational requirement to provide increased reliability, 
survivability, higher hit/kill probability, and greater effective range against current and 
future armored threats.  It is comprised of a tactical round (wooden round), a command 
launch unit (CLU), and a set of training devices.  The CLU and training devices require 
support and maintenance following fielding.  (DOD, 2001) 
    
Figure 2-4. Javelin Weapon System. 
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3. Systems Considering LCCS 
 
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) answers an Army need 
for a rapidly-deployable fire support delivery system capable of delivering the MLRS 
Family of Munitions (MFOM) in support of airborne, air assault divisions, and 
forced/early entry contingency operations.  The system is transportable by C-130 aircraft 
whereas the M270 and M270A1 are not.  It is a wheeled version of the MLRS launcher 
and is mounted and fully-integrated on a 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
(FMTV) truck chassis.  The vehicle will carry one launch pod of six MLRS rockets or 
one ATACMS missile and be capable of firing all current and future MFOM rockets and 
missiles.  It utilizes the same Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) as the M270A1 and 
is fully interoperable with all Allied and North Atlantic Treaty Organization MLRS users.  
(Precision Fires, 2002) 
The M270A1 Launcher recapitalizes the MLRS M270 basic launcher and 
upgrades both the fire control system and the launcher mechanical system.  The IFCS 
corrects present and future supportability problems in the current MLRS Fire Control 
System resulting from electronic component obsolescence.  Reduced operation and 
support costs are expected along will growth capabilities for existing and future MLRS 
Family-of-Munitions systems.  The Improved Launcher Mechanical System decreases the 
stow-to-aim point time line, enhances effectiveness in engaging and supporting the force, 
while increasing the MLRS platform survivability.  (DOD, 2001) 
13 
 
Figure 2-5. M270A1. 
The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) builds upon the 2.75 
inch Rocket System and the technology developed for the Longbow HELLFIRE.  The 
APKWS is a low cost laser-guided rocket that evolved from the HYDRA-70 2.75-inch 
rocket system.  It will be compatible with all Army attack and reconnaissance helicopters.  
United States forces will utilize the system across the full spectrum of operations and find 
it complementary to the current unguided rockets, anti-tank missiles, and cannon of 
current and planned helicopters.  A decision between organic and contracted support will 
be made in the future.  (APKWS Core Depot Assessment, 2002) 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The DOD supply infrastructure is costly to maintain and continues to deplete the 
funding available to develop and produce new, more technically advanced weapon 
systems.  The technical nature of new systems requires more support from developers, 
such as prime contractors, to maintain readiness levels.  The outcome is a spiral of 
increasing costs for older systems and reduced funding for new methods to decrease 
those same costs.  Congress mandated that the Defense Department initiate a program 
comprised of weapon systems from all the Services to implement acquisition reforms 
resulting in reduced operation and support costs.  Reduced support costs while increasing 
funding for new developments and productions was the goal.   
14 
The Army proposed using the AH-64 Apache program as the primary pilot 
program with a far-reaching plan to pass traditional logistical efforts performed by the 
Government to a contractor team made up of Boeing and Lockheed Martin.  The effort 
met great resistance within the traditional logistics management members.  The Army 
CEAC, Army Audit Agency, and Army Comptroller questioned the proposed savings 
associated with the dollars to pay the Working Capital Fund for spares given to 
contractor.  Apache PVS was not implemented and the Army looked to the PEO, Tactical 
Missiles to offer potential participants.  Three programs, ITAS, Javelin, and HIMARS, 
formally participate in the program.  Of these, ITAS and Javelin have successfully 
obtained approval from the Army leadership to implement LCCS concepts.  HIMARS is 
seeking approval concurrently with their Low Rate Initial Production Milestone.  Other 
programs may follow and they must meet both statutory and regulatory requirements to 
implement further strategies. 
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III.  CONSTRAINTS REGARDING LCCS 
A. STATUTES 
Webster’s Dictionary, defines statutes as a law passed by a legislative body to 
govern actions.  (Neufeldt, 1995)  Within the Defense acquisition community, United 
States Code, Title X, serves the purpose of written law governing the activities to 
develop, produce, and support weapon systems utilizing taxpayers’ dollars.  Congress 
approves and passes the laws that the President of the United States, through the Defense 
Department, executes or adheres to.  Before contracting for Life-Cycle Contractor 
Support, one must familiarize themselves with Title X, Chapter 146, Contracting for 
Performance of Civilian Commercial or Industrial Type Functions.  This study focuses on 
those laws, Federal Acquisition Regulations, Government policies, and guidelines 
associated with weapon system maintenance and contracting for services.  (Title X, 2002) 
1. Section 2460 – Definition of Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair 
Within Chapter 146, the term depot-level maintenance and repair is defined as 
material maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, 
assemblies, or subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment as necessary, 
regardless of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair.  It also includes all 
aspects of software maintenance as depot-level maintenance and repair, as well as, 
interim contractor support or contractor logistics support (or any similar contractor 
support) pertaining to efforts defined in the previous sentence.  It does not include 
procurement of major modifications or upgrades of weapons designed to improve their 
performance, nor does it include the procurement of parts associated with safety 
improvements or modifications.  It does include the installation of the procured parts if 
the depot performs the effort.  This thesis concentrates on activities covered under the 
primary definition and does not focus on software maintenance that is often acquired 
using a separate Engineering Services contract.  (Title X, 2002) 
2. Section 2466 – Limitations On the Performance of Depot-Level 
Maintenance of Material 
Section 2466 of Chapter 146, involves the definition of the limitation for funds 
usage for a fiscal year for a military department or defense agency for depot-level 
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maintenance and repair workload.  The limit applies to contracted workload performed 
by non-Federal Government entities except for the Sacramento Army Depot (SAD) in 
Sacramento, California, which was excluded from Section 2466 compliance, until its 
closure in 1995.  Since 1997, the limit remains at 40% of the workload required to 
maintain and repair equipment.  The Secretary of Defense must submit an annual report 
to Congress identifying by each department and Defense Agency, the percentage of 
funding used for contracted maintenance and support expended in the preceding fiscal 
year.  This section of Title X provides the basis for the large amount of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Army scrutiny prior to approval for LCCS activities.  
(Title X, 2002) 
Section 331 of Public Law 103-337 stated the following important Congressional 
findings associated with depot-level maintenance activities: 
(1) By providing the Armed Forces with a critical capacity to respond to 
the needs of the Armed Forces for depot-level maintenance and repair of 
weapon systems and equipment, the depot-level maintenance and repair 
activities of the Department of Defense play an essential role in 
maintaining the readiness of the Armed Forces. 
(2) It is appropriate for the capability of the depot-level maintenance and 
repair activities of the Department of Defense to perform maintenance and 
repair of weapon systems and equipment to be based on policies that take 
into consideration the readiness, mobilization, and deployment 
requirements of the military departments. 
(3) It is appropriate for the management of employees of the depot-level 
maintenance and repair activities of the Department of Defense to be 
based on the amount of workload necessary to be performed by such 
activities to maintain the readiness of the weapon systems and equipment 
of the military departments and on the funds made available for the 
performance of such workload.  (Title X, 2002) 
Congress mandated competition pilot programs as part of Public Law 101-510 for 
fiscal year 1991, but it was repealed by Public Law 102-190 in 1991 and added additional 
requirements for a Comptroller General review and a Secretary of Defense five-year 
strategy describing the anticipated cost savings associated with the use of the procedures.  
This law supports the requirement to conduct economic analyses of potential contracting 
strategies for LCCS.  (Title X, 2002) 
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3. Section 2469 – Contracts To Perform Workloads Previously 
Performed By Depot-Level Activities of the Department of Defense:  
Requirement of Competition 
Section 2469 mandates the use of merit-based selection procedures among all 
depot-level activities within the Defense Department or competitive procedures among 
private and public sector entities.  It applies to any workload with a value of $3 million or 
more that is currently a part of the Department of Defense.  In 1994, Congress changed 
the law to prohibit the changing of Federal-Government depot-level maintenance and 
repair performance efforts to contracted efforts without conducting competition.  (Title 
X, 2002) 
4. Section 2469a – Use of Competitive Procedures In Contracting For 
Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair Workloads 
Formerly Performed at Certain Military Installations 
Section 2469a further refines the law outlined in Section 2469 to include closed or 
realigned military installations that formally closed as part of the 1995 Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 except for the workload deemed necessary to 
maintain a core logistics capability identified under section 2464 of Title X.  The Section 
further outlines the review procedures for competitively contracting depot-level activities 
associated with closed or re-aligned military installation efforts along with resolution of 
workload award objections.  (Title X, 2002) 
5. Sections 2464 – Core Logistics Capabilities 
Public Law 105-85, Section 356, added the requirement for the Department of 
Defense to maintain a core logistics capability that is Government-owned and operated 
(meaning workload performed by Government personnel at Government-owned facilities 
using Government-operated equipment) for a  
… ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources 
necessary to ensure effective and timely response…  
to national emergencies.  The Secretary of Defense must identify the core logistics 
capabilities required to maintain and repair weapon systems and military equipment 
(including mission-essential equipment or materiel) not later than four years following 
initial operational capability.  Core logistics capabilities can exclude systems and 
equipment under special access programs, nuclear aircraft carriers, and commercial 
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items.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must consult on the identification to 
assure the ability of the armed forces to meet defined strategic and contingency plans.  
The law also mandates that the Secretary of Defense assign sufficient workload to ensure 
cost efficiency and technical competence in peacetime while preserving surge capacity 
and reconstitution capabilities necessary to support the strategic and contingency plans 
defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  (Title X, 2002) 
Prohibitions exist against contracting for the core logistics workload unless the 
Defense Secretary waives the exception and states that the effort no longer meets the 
national defense reason requirements.  The waiver must include criteria for determining 
why the workload does not need maintaining within the core logistics environment.  The 
Senate’s Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, along with the House of 
Representatives’ Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, receive the waivers 
for Congressional review.  Waiver approvals cannot take effect until the expiration of the 
first 30-day period of continuous Congressional session.  (Title X, 2002) 
Public Law 105-261, added that the Secretary of a military department cannot 
enter into a contract for prime vendor support until the Secretary submits a report to 
Congress outlining the competitive procedures used to award the contract and an analysis 
of the cost savings and benefits to the Government for the life of the contract.  
Definitions for prime vendor contract included prime vendor support contracts, flexible 
sustainment contracts, and direct vendor delivery contracts.  The law applies to Life-
Cycle Contractor Support.  (Title X, 2002) 
Section 2464 also governs commercial items (and weapon systems classified as 
commercial items).  The Secretary of Defense must notify Congress of the determination 
and present the associated justification for the finding.  The justification includes an 
estimated percentage of commonality of parts between the commercial marketplace item 
and the Government version; the value of unique support, test equipment, and tools 
necessary for military requirement support; and an estimated life-cycle logistics support 
cost comparison between commercial and Government support.  (Title X, 2002) 
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B. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS AND DEFENSE FEDERAL 
ACQUISITION REGULATIONS 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) incorporates statutes relative to 
contracting with federal agencies.  The FAR governs activities including construction, 
services, and acquisition of weapon systems.  The Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (DFAR) addresses contracting actions pertaining to the Defense Department 
by incorporating overall policies and Congressional enactments.  Each service within the 
Department of Defense provides specific acquisition regulations referred to as the Army 
FAR (AFAR), Navy FAR (NFAR), or Air Force FAR (AFFAR).  For this thesis, the 
FAR, DFAR, and AFAR are addressed respective to warranties – tools used by the 
Program Manager to achieve an objective.  Warranties can motivate producers to “design, 
produce, and deliver” better weapon systems and provide the Government with recourse 
should performance not meet contractual requirements.  A prime example is the incentive 
warranty that encourages the contractor to improve upon the minimum acceptable 
performance specification requirement.  (ASC Program Managers Warranty Guide, 
March 2002) 
 In the early 1970s, the Assistant Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum 
requesting the services to conduct a trial warranty application in an attempt to lower 
support costs.  This initial concept was known as the Reliability Improvement Program.  
By the 1980s, the use of warranties (or guarantees as they are often termed) was a 
standard option, but the application varied by program office.  Section 794 of the Defense 
Appropriation Act of 1984 required major weapon system prime contractors to provide 
three written guarantees.  This was incorporated into Title X, U.S. Code Section 2403 and 
became effective in 1985.  Section 2403 further specified specific remedies for the 
Government should the contractor fail to meet the guarantees.  This law was repealed in 
1998 under Public Law 105-85, Section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
based, in part, on a General Accounting Office report in 1996 that stated annual Defense 
Department warranty expenditures of $271 million returned only five cents per dollar.  
GAO stated that warranties for weapon system acquisition was  
not practical and [did] not provide sufficient benefits to the Government.  
(ASC, 2000) 
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Title 41, U.S. Code 264, incorporated the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 requirement for contracting officers to incorporate commercial warranties 
(including extended warranties) when applicable.  The law provides for the Government 
to receive the same warranty terms as offered to the public in typical commercial 
practice.  (ASC, 2000)   
Today, FAR Subpart 46.7, Warranties, provides overall guidance for the use of 
warranties relative to federal acquisition.  FAR Subpart 46.703 outlines the use of 
warranties and Table 3-1 depicts the detailed criteria.  FAR Subpart 46.704 presents 
warranty limitations and FAR Subpart 46.706 outlines specific terms and conditions.  
Pricing aspects are imparted in Subpart 46.707.  FAR, Chapter 46 incorporates the FASA 
requirement for commercial items (FAR Subpart 46.709) and specific clauses are located 
in Subpart 46.710.  (FAR, 2002) 
The DFAR Subpart 246.704 provides authority for the use of warranties in fixed-
price type contracts containing quality assurance provisions that reference higher-level 
contract quality requirements (cohesive with DFAR Subpart 246.202-4).  (DFAR, 1998) 
C. POLICIES AND GUIDES 
Title X forms the basis for further definition by Defense regulations and policies.  
The Secretary of Defense initiates policies that find themselves incorporated into the 
services’ regulations and guidelines.  The Program Executive Officers and Program 
Managers have the ultimate responsibility of executing the laws and regulations to assure 
compliance for their programs.  The Department of Defense’s mandatory document, 
DOD 5000 series, outlines acquisition requirements for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs).  Each service then implements their own set of mandatory and 
guideline documents associated with internal policies embracing the Congressional 
mandates and the Defense regulations. 
1. Joint Aeronautical Commanders’ Flexible Sustainment Guide 
In July 1999, the Joint Aeronautical Commanders’ Group, under the Joint 
Logistics Commanders, issued a Flexible Sustainment Guide update addressing guidance 
on Total Ownership Cost, including information on new approaches to long-term 
contracting, and integrating a Depot Maintenance Decision Process.  The guide 
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incorporates the recent acquisition reform efforts as well as providing useful techniques 
for determining life-cycle support concepts and contracting strategies.  Figure 3-1 denotes 
a process associated with Reliability Based Logistics Decisions helpful in determining 
maintenance concepts.  The guide supplies an appendix on warranty types associated 
with LCCS.  (JACG, 1999) 
 
 





2. Guidebook For Performance-Based Services Acquisition In The DOD 
In January 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (USD(ALT)) issued a guidebook with a goal of promoting performance-
based strategies for service acquisitions; educating the workforce and highlighting key 
elements of performance-based services acquisition; promoting use of the commercial 
market place; and increasing awareness that performance-based acquisition requires 
participation from all stakeholders.  The guide emphasizes the involvement of industry in 
the process, especially when requirements are complex.  It further enunciated the need to 
move from a narrow-vision view of contract management to a broader-view relative to 
business management.  The document provides examples of positive and negative 
incentives for contracting use (see Figure 3-2) along with an appendix associated with 
award terms for use in long-term business relationships between Government and 
industry.  (DOD, Dec 2001) 
 
Figure 3-2. Positive and Negative Incentives for Contracts.  (from DOD, 2001, 
without change) 
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3. Modernization Success Spiral 
In 1999, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA(ALT)) issued a memorandum regarding a “Modernization Success 
Spiral” that included initiatives for managing reliability growth.  Increasing reliability 
leads to longer-lasting spare parts, thus reducing maintenance labor, inventories, and 
demand for parts storage and transportation.  Reduced costs associated with the improved 
reliability results in increased resources for equipment modernization leading to further 
replacements of aging equipment, leading again to more reductions in maintenance costs.  
A success spiral evolves from what was a death spiral (see Figure 3-3).  The policy 
emphasized a focus on lowest Total Ownership Cost versus the previous emphasis on 
lowest acquisition cost.  It further addressed partnering with the Defense Logistics 
Agency to consider specifications; technical data packages; and especially contracting 
strategies to focus on achieving the lowest total ownership cost and still yield positive 
results.  (Hoeper, 1999) 
 
Figure 3-3. Modernization Success Spiral.  (from Hoeper, 1999, without change) 
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4. Army Implementation Of Performance Based Logistics 
As part of the September 2001, Quadrennial Defense Review mandate to 
implement Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), the Army issued a memorandum in 
April 2002 requesting that Program Managers review Acquisition Category I and II 
weapon systems for the potential of implementing the philosophy.  PBL requires 
programs to incorporate the following into the product support management planning: 
...[I]ntegrated supply chains segmented support by system or subsystems; 
Maintaining a relationship with the warfighter based on system readiness; 
Selection of best-value, long-term product support providers and 
integrators based on competition; 
Measuring support performance based on high-level metrics such as 
mission capable rates;  
Improved product affordability and system reliability; and 
Dedicated investment in technology refreshment.   
The document relayed the requirement from the FY 2003-07 Defense Planning Guidance 
for submission of Military Department plans identifying PBL implementation schedules 
for all new weapon systems and ACAT I and II fielded systems.  (Bolton, 2002) 
5. Contracted Logistics Support Implementation Best Practices 
Handbook 
The PEO, Tactical Missiles, issued its own Guide for implementing Contracted 
Logistics Support in April 2001 in order to provide the Program Managers of tactical 
missile systems with a compilation of best practices from regulations, articles, and system 
support concepts.  The handbook includes various contracting methods deemed 
appropriate for LCCS.  The PEO considers this a living document.  (PEO, TM, 2001) 
D. SUMMARY 
The support of the United States military systems and equipment comprises the 
largest amount of expenditures associated with defense.  Due to the costs, Congress has 
imposed laws and restrictions governing the expenditure of taxpayer resources for 
contracted support.  A program may obtain a waiver through extensive analysis and 
justification, but contract award must wait until 30 days following Congressional 
notification. 
The Defense Department embraces these laws and has implemented policies, 
regulations, and guidelines for the services’ execution.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff for 
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Logistics issued a Flexible Sustainment Guide to provide further direction and guidance 
in implementing initiatives in hopes of reducing the sustainment cost burden.  It is hoped 
that the reduced costs will generate funds for developing more reliable equipment and 
transform what could have ended up as a death spiral into a modernization success spiral. 
The Army has further refined the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiatives 
into guidelines for performance-based acquisitions and logistics.  To provide assistance to 
the programs managed by the PEO, Tactical Missiles, an Integrated Product Team was 
established with the Aviation and Missile Command’s Integrated Materiel Management 
Center and the PEO to develop a CLS Best Practices Handbook.  With the aid of the FAR 
and DFAR, Program Managers can better define viable contracting activities by 
leveraging off of the statutes, regulations, policies, and guidelines to contract for LCCS 
efforts while maintaining readiness levels and congressionally-mandated Government 




























IV.  CONTRACTING FOR LCCS 
A. CURRENT CONTRACT APPROACHES 
Two programs managed by the Program Executive Office, Tactical Missiles, have 
received approval for Life-cycle Contractor Support and have either awarded contracts or 
will do so within the near future.  They are the ITAS and Javelin programs within the 
Close Combat Missile Systems Program Office.  Javelin received Department of the 
Army approval to contract out the Command Launch Unit support in March 2002.  Both 
efforts present similar concepts and lessons learned.   
1. ITAS Contract   
The Close Combat Missile System Program Office awarded a LCCS contract in 
FY 2001 for the ITAS.  The contract is firm-fixed price with annual awards covering a 
twelve-month period of performance.  Priced options exist allowing for more efficient 
awarding of follow-on efforts.  The program office included unpriced options for “Go-
To-War” contingencies.  (Barnett, 2002) 
Operational Availability (OA) provides the basis for Contractor performance 
metrics and the foundation for award fee decisions.  The contractor obtains optimum 
award fee when OA exceeds 90%, with the fee amount increasing to 100% as OA 
approaches 100%.  No award fee is given should one Battalion experience an OA less 
than 90% for two consecutive months, or if three Battalions experience less than 90% OA 
during an award fee period.  (Barnett, 2002)   
The contractor receives a negative incentive of both no award fee receipt and an 
obligation to provide increased spares equal to the number of unfilled requisitions in that 
month, if a Division experiences less than 90% OA for a month.  .  Should the Division 
experience a less than 90% OA for two consecutive months, no award fee is authorized 
and the contractor must increase spares by the number of unfilled requisitions for the 
second month.  If any one system down time exceeds thirty days, then the contractor 




The Javelin Weapon System is preparing a LCCS contract to support the 
Command Launch Unit and associated training devices for the Army, Marine Corps, and 
future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) participants.  The Javelin system plans include 
contractor and Government teaming arrangement under a firm-fixed price contract for an 
initial six-month effort beginning in June/July 2003 (if funding permits) with annually 
awarded contract options for ten years.  The United Kingdom (a FMS case to this country 
is in preparation) has expressed a desire for a twenty-year performance period.  The 
Statement of Objectives delineates a list of firm-fixed price goals consisting of:   
Maintaining an OA of 90% at the Army battalion level; 
Repair Turn-Around-Time (TAT) of 10 days for Direct Support level 
maintenance actions; 
Repair TAT of 30 days for depot level maintenance actions; 
New Equipment Training (NET); 
Total Package Fielding (TPF); 
Missile surveillance; 
One block modification every two years; 
LCCS management plan; 
Specified number of maintenance actions per year; 
Use of existing facilities, personnel, equipment, materials, procedures, and 
technical data (already in place); and  
Software support.  (CCMS, 2002) 
Firm-fixed price options exist for FMS support, surge usage based on Operating 
Tempo, and transitioning to organic support, if required.  Cost-plus-award fee 
arrangements include Go-To-War, changes to deployment, NET, and/or TPF, and spares.  
Contractor incentivization is based on modernization and increasing the system’s 
capability resulting in additional user fighting capabilities.  The PM is utilizing Alpha 
Contracting approach to finalize the contract and the above concepts may change through 
that process.  (CCMS, 2002) 
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B.   POTENTIAL CONTRACTING APPROACHES 
The risk associated with the contracted efforts determines the type of contract 
utilized for LCCS.  When determining the contract type, the PM should consider the 
following items:  prior contract performance, risk assessment, acquisition policy, funding 
projections, and industry responses.  Additional factors include pricing history, stability 
of design (changes equal increased risk), and program life-cycle phase.  Potential contract 
types include firm-fixed price, award term, and cost-plus, coupled with either an 
incentive fee or award fee.  Incentives are integral to a successful contract effort and 
usually occur in conjunction with pre-described performance metrics.  Contract 
approaches use warranties and teaming arrangements to extend the flexibility for an 
effective and efficient support concept.  Contract type discussion occurs below.  (JACG, 
1999) 
1. Contract Types   
a. Award Term   
The Air Force uses Award Term contracts for Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) and requirements type efforts.  ID/IQ works 
effectively in the support arena for the procurement of spares and repair parts.  Award 
Term is simply a modification of the Award Fee.  In lieu of monetary rewards, the 
contractor is provided additional periods of performance for successfully fulfilling the 
Government’s requirements.  An Award Term Review Board employs an Award Term 
Plan, developed prior to contract award, to evaluate contractor performance.  The Review 
Board makes a recommendation to a Term Determining Official (TDO), who makes the 
final decision on the contractor’s performance for that period and results in either an 
extension or reduction in the contract’s period of performance.  A disadvantage of this 
contract type is the additional administrative effort and maintenance cost associated with 
the award term process.  Conducting a cost benefit analysis prior to adoption, aids in 
determining the implementation value.  (Air Force, 2002) 
The Air Force recently limited the use of Award Term contracts to ID/IQ 
efforts pending review of fiscal law aspects involving other types of procurement efforts.  
While the Air Force acknowledges the benefits of efficiency and non-cost incentivization 
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aspects of Award Terms, concerns exist involving the implications of committing 
resources prior to appropriation or the unintentional multi-year scenario that could 
develop.  To avoid these issues, the Air Force implemented three conditions for ID/IQ 
contracts.  They are:  synopsize and evaluation estimated costs or proposed price of each 
award term with the basic contract requirement; maximum timeframes in which the 
ordering period of the contract extension must be specified within the contract, and 
include a clear statement of the potential for performance period reduction within the 
synopsis.  (Federal Contracts Report, 2002). 
b. Firm-Fixed Price   
This type of contract can incentivize the contractor through the lowering 
of performance costs to earn profit.  The contract price remains constant (provided there 
is no increase in the scope of the effort) while the contractor determines how much 
reduced costs and increased profits are attainable.  The risk level is greatest for the 
contractor under this type of contract.  Contract cost reductions occur through increased 
reliability (thereby reducing the need for spares and repair parts), reduced turn around 
times for repairs, or anything else that the contractor deems appropriate and achievable.  
A long-term contract (ten to twenty years) based on firm-fixed pricing may not be 
attractive to contractors.  (JACG, 1999) 
A fixed-price incentive fee contract utilizes a specified target cost, target 
price, a price ceiling, and a profit adjustment formula.  The Government and contractor 
negotiate the final cost and develop the final price through the application of the incentive 
fee adjustment formula.  Risk distribution occurs via the contract target-ceiling price that 
establishes an upper boundary for the Government’s financial liability.  The negotiated 
ceiling allows the contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk.  This contract 
type is beneficial when both parties can agree, at the beginning, on firm target costs, 
profit, and the profile adjustment formula that will provide a fair and reasonable 
incentive.  (JACG, 1999) 
The fixed-price incentive contract allows the Government to incentivize 
the contractor for specific areas or efforts since cost is a mandated area for contract 
performance.  Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) reliability factors and overall item life 
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provide examples of potential incentive provisions.  The contractor must focus on the 
Government’s desires in order to earn additional fee, thus providing a strong advantage 
for this contract type.  It is attractive to contractors for long-term contractual 
arrangements because the Government accepts and shares in the cost risk.  A 
disadvantage is the delay of determining final cost and price until the completion of the 
effort.  This delay can result in the contractor not receiving full financial benefits until 
fifteen years, or more, following contract initiation.  A possible work-around exists 
through a contract modification allowing the contractor to receive fee benefits based on 
reliability enhancements.  (JACG, 1999) 
c. Cost-Plus   
A variety of cost-plus type contracts exist including cost-plus incentive fee 
and cost-plus award fee.  Descriptions of these types occur below.  Cost-plus contracts 
shift the risks to the Government since the performance costs can increase above the 
original contracted amount and the Government agrees to pay all or part of the additional 
costs to the contractor.  Added incentive fees and award fees provide mechanisms to 
enhance contractor performance for important program specific objectives.   
A cost-plus incentive fee contract allows for an initially agreed upon fee 
that is adjusted later by a formula derived from the relationship of total allowable costs to 
total target costs.  This contract type includes a target cost, target fee, minimum and 
maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula.  Following contract completion, 
application of the formula determines the contractor’s appropriate fee.  The contractor 
shares incurred costs, above the target-ceiling price, with the Government based on the 
adjustment formula.  Support and sustainment efforts rarely utilize this contract type 
because it is more appropriate for development and test programs, where the 
efforts/outcomes exhibit greater risks.  (JACG, 1999) 
d. Award Fees   
The difference between an incentive fee and an award fee contract resides 
with how and when the contractor earns the fee.  Pre-determined formulas, negotiated 
with the contract, form the basis for incentive fees.  For the award fee, a set amount is 
determined at contract inception and the pool of dollars is set aside for future award.  The 
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contractor earns either all, or a part of, the award fee based upon subjective Government 
analysis.  The award fee’s intended goal is to enhance contractor performance in areas 
critical to program success that are susceptible to subjective measurement and evaluation.  
Use of award fees is appropriate when the planned work does not support pre-determined 
objective incentive targets for cost, technical performance, or schedule.  It is also 
appropriate when motivating the contractor to exceptional performance also meets 
acquisition objectives.  Award fees provide the Government with a flexible means to 
evaluate both achieved performance and environmental conditions.  (JACG, 1999) 
Evaluation occurs at contractually stated intervals during the performance 
period to allow the contractor to receive input regarding the quality of their performance.  
Partial award of the fee usually corresponds to the evaluations.  An example of award fee 
application is associated with providing the contractor with fee increases for reliability 
improvements at incremental periods throughout the contract’s life.  (JACG, 1999) 
Award fees can reside within any type of contract, at any stage of the 
product life-cycle, and for supplies or services.  Do not limit award fees to best effort 
contracts.  Couple award fee provisions with Fixed-Price efforts to achieve a cost 
effective means of obtaining and/or managing support efforts.  Per Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) 16.404-2(c)(3), the contract amount, performance period, and expected 
benefits must sufficiently warrant the additional administrative effort and costs involved 
in monitoring and developing evaluations.  (JACG, 1999) 
2. Incentives and Metrics   
a. Operational Availability   
Weapon system availability is the ultimate metric to use with performance 
based logistics and is the Army’s designated metric for contract performance evaluation.  
Every logistics element contributes to system availability:  training systems, parts 
availability, maintenance, subsystem component reliability, transportation, support 
concept, etc.  Areas outside the contractor’s control, such as military maintenance 
personnel, can contribute to non-availability of the system.  All cost drivers should be 
part of the contractor’s influence for ultimate benefit.  Avoid potential problems by 
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specifically addressing the contractor’s responsibility within the statement of work or 
statement of objectives.  (Schmierer, 2002) 
b. Mission Capable (MC) Rate   
Another useful availability subset metric is the mission capable rate.  MC 
is often used for subsystems providing specific capabilities.  The contractor must improve 
the subsystem’s reliability to prevent adverse impacts to system availability and to assist 
with meeting the total system’s goals.  When used alone, MC rate can increase costs 
unnecessarily if the subsystem is not inherent to the weapon system’s mission 
availability.  The two must link contextually for the most cost-effective application.  
(Schmierer, 2002) 
c. System Reliability   
Incentivizing subsystem reliability must incorporate the effects upon the 
total system.  Failing to do so can result in unaffordable systems due to inordinate 
amounts of money used to improve subsystem reliability and increasing the component’s 
cost within the system.  The statements above concerning MC rate also apply to system 
reliability.  Improvements to system reliability offer the greatest opportunity to reduce 
life-cycle support costs. 
d. Cost Per Operating Hour   
Fielded systems offer more credibility for measuring cost per operating 
hour than systems currently in development.  There is a direct correlation to system 
availability, but extensive knowledge of weapon system cost drivers must exist and be 
within the contractor’s control.  For this reason, do not include military personnel costs 
when calculating this metric. 
3. Warranties   
Warranties are an aspect of the contract terms and conditions.  They are 
negotiable and should consider weapon system’s planned operational, maintenance, and 
supply concepts.  The FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) provide 
statements for utilization in warranty clauses.  The clause must clearly state the 
Government’s rights, such as latent defects, fraud, and redesign as a remedy.   
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Conditions and possible warranties include: 
 Spare costs less than repair –  Reliability Incentive Warranty 
Reliability & Maintenance Improvement Warranty 
    Availability Guarantee 
    Maximum Parts Guarantee 
    Spare Parts Level Warranty 
    Component Reliability Warranty 
    Repair & Exchange Agreements 
Contract repair (costs less than organic) – 
    Reliability Incentive Warranty 
Reliability & Maintenance Improvement Warranty 
    Availability Guarantee 
    Logistics Support Cost Guarantee 
    Maximum Parts Cost Guarantee 
    Reliability Warranty 
    Repair & Exchange Agreements 
 
The Government must consider the costs associated with maintaining and 
enforcing warranties when determining their use.  It is very difficult to collect on a 
warranty claim if ambiguities exist within the contractual language.  Use within cost-plus 
contracts is discouraged due to the likelihood for the Government to share in the cost 
risks.  Warranties are better suited for firm-fixed price contracts awarded for supplies 
and/or services.  PMs should avoid warranty clauses and procedures that impact 
readiness.  They should not impose limited or special reporting requirements on the user 
personnel (especially at the organizational level).  Analysis of all logistics elements 
ensures the maximum Government use.  Factors to consider include transportation and 
storage.  (DAU, 2002) 
4. Teaming 
Teaming involves the partnering of a Government entity (e.g. a Government-
operated depot) and a contractor.  Both ITAS and Javelin contracted with the system 
development contractor that in turn, contracted with a Government depot for the actual 
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maintenance effort.  The contractor manages the effort, supplies parts when required, and 
provides engineering services to the depot for maintenance activities.  This type of 
arrangement enhances the Defense Department organic depots by allowing them to fulfill 
the national security need for retaining a depot maintenance capability.  The result is a 
greater private sector investment in the facilities and equipment, improved facility use, 
reduced total ownership costs, more efficient business processes, workforce integration, 
and increased credibility.   
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal-Year 2002 included two 
provisions that were extremely beneficial to partnering arrangements.  They consisted of 
and exemption from the percentage limit allowable to DoD for contracted depot efforts 
and the hold harmless provision against the private sector to include cost, schedule, and 
quality as a basis for claim filing should the public sector fail to comply with a contract.  
The Army logistics community encourages partnering arrangements for life-cycle 
contractor support concepts.  (FLE, 2002) 
The teaming concept allows an effective means to manage risks between the 
Government and private sectors.  It allows both to efficiently provide those services that 
best meet the system’s availability and stay within the confines of the law for retaining 
depot capability within the public sector. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Core Depot Assessment 
United States Code, Title X mandates performance of a core depot assessment at 
both Milestone B and C reviews.  OSD has developed a set of guidelines PMs must use to 
answer questions regarding capabilities for repairing their systems within the depot 
framework.  If the capability exists, then the PM may perform a qualitative and 
quantitative benefit analysis to determine if life-cycle contracted support is feasible.  If 
the maintenance capability does not exist within the existing depot framework, the PM 
must facilitize and train the depot to perform the effort. 
A clear understanding between service logistics agencies and the PM must exist to 
facilitate the completion of this assessment.  This understanding allows the determination 
of all possible alternatives of interest to the Service and to allow the agency to effectively 
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communicate the decision to Congressional entities.  It is an integral part of the PM’s 
vertical communication exercises. 
2. Update Benefit Analysis 
The efforts associated with developing a viable benefit analysis highlights the 
numerous opportunities associated with contractual activities.  When changes in the 
proposed solution occur, it is important to update the analysis to determine if the 
alternative is the most cost effective solution.  Neglecting to do so can result in enlarging 
the scope of effort beyond the resources of the Service.  In today’s fiduciary environment, 
it is a PM’s responsibility to provide all information necessary to decision-makers to 
allow them the ability to make knowledgeable and cost effective decisions. 
3. Determine Funding Mechanism Early 
Funding constraints impact the type and length of contracts used for LCCS.  
Three issues related to buying support are the use of operations and maintenance funds, 
the expiration of funds, and the flow of funding to the PM.  The first relates to the color 
of money and directly correlates to the type of services the PM can buy.  Research and 
development (R&D) funds are used for development and associated testing efforts.  
Procurement funds allow for the purchase of hardware and services following successful 
fulfillment of development activities.  The operations and maintenance (O&M) funds are 
used to obtain replenishment parts and services once the hardware is fielded and a 
decision is made to either support the system via LCCS or through an organic system. 
The time limits on funding vary by the color of the money.  O&M funds have the 
shortest life span and cannot always support the modification or improvement of a system 
or its components.  Often, one must use all three types of funding to improve or enhance 
the weapon system and timing becomes an intricate balancing act. 
Finally, the flow of funding to the PM occurs when the PM is the buyer for 
support services performed outside the typical organic infrastructure.  This issue was a 
primary concern associated with the Apache PVS decision.  Systems already part of the 
Working Capital Fund utilized by the organic infrastructure cannot be easily diverted to 




Contracting for Life-cycle Support involves multiple decisions and activities.  
Developing a viable business plan must include an efficient and flexible contract type 
comprised of effective mechanisms to both incentivize and measure contractor 
performance.  ITAS and Javelin chose similar strategies and only time will determine if 
the mechanisms are sufficient to enhance the system support concepts.  Changes in 
philosophy can occur as information is gathered and incorporated into the benefit analysis 
allows for the informed selection of cost effective approaches.  Cost cannot comprise the 
only decision-making criteria; use of qualitative data is also needed. 
Contract types consist of cost-plus, fixed-price, and award term.  Each offers 
benefits and drawbacks.  Pairing of any type with incentives and metrics allows a flexible 
means to enhance the efficiency of the program’s support requirements.  Other types of 
contractual efforts exist with warranties and teaming arrangements.  Numerous 
warranties exist to meet conditions associated with maintenance and support 
environments.  Teaming provides an efficient manner to both facilitate and retain organic 
depot capability while allowing the private sector to actively participate in both 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The costs to support and maintain weapon systems are increasing every year.  
Systems are staying in the inventory for longer periods, thus driving the life-cycle costs 
up at a rate that outpaces the Services’ ability to fund them.  The research and 
procurement funding accounts are being used as a means to resource the support efforts.  
OEMs own the rights to software, and under performance specifications, the Government 
does not actually buy the technical data packages that would allow broad competition for 
technically-advanced hardware.  In an effort to provide cost efficient maintenance and 
support for fielded hardware, contracting for life-cycle support is gaining in popularity. 
To prevent the erosion of the Government capability within the depot structure, 
Congress promulgated laws to preclude the arbitrary determination to contract out 
maintenance-related activities.  Mechanisms exist to determine if the depot currently 
provides the expertise, and if not, mandate that the program office establish the 
capability.  If the capability does exist, and contracting out the effort does not diminish it, 
conducting a benefit analysis aids in determining the best alternative, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.  The approach is based upon either a specific or mixture of contract 
types, with incentives to enhance performance and metrics to measure that performance. 
Contract types include firm-fixed price and cost-plus.  Incentives can range from 
incentive to award fees, or mixtures of each.  Award Term contracts have gained in 
popularity within the Air Force due to their ability to provide non-monetary incentives to 
the contractor.  Under an Award Term contract, the performance period can be extended 
as a performance incentive.  Recently, the Air Force has limited the use of Award Term 
endeavors to Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity parts contracts.  Concerns arose 
regarding the potential for commitment of funds not yet appropriated by Congress and 
the ability to extend periods of performance into a category termed multi-year.  Multi-
year contracts must have Congressional approval prior to award. 
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Warranties and Teaming arrangements offer other means to contract for 
support/parts.  Warranties exist within contract clauses.  The FAR and DFAR provide 
specific language for use in contractual arrangements.  Certain conditions may necessitate 
specific clauses.  The Government must maintain the ability to hold the contractor 
responsible for latent defects and the ability to request redesign/modifications to correct 
said defects at no additional cost.  Teaming provides both the Government and the private 
sector with a viable way to establish and maintain a core depot capability while involving 
the contractor through parts supply and depot engineering support.  These Life-Cycle 
Contractor Support arrangements are encouraged within the Army. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What Various Contracting Opportunities Exist to Provide Life-Cycle 
Contractor Support (LCCS) for Army Tactical Missile Systems?   
Most Army missile systems are considered “wooden rounds,” that is, they do not 
require regularly scheduled maintenance.  Recently, the Army is analyzing the costs 
associated with unscheduled modifications compared to regular maintenance activities to 
insert reliability improvements.  Repair Level Analysis has shown that regular 
maintenance is worth investigating for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(GMLRS).   
The missile launch platforms require maintenance and support.  It is one of the 
major life-cycle cost drivers when assessing spares and repair parts requirements for the 
ten-to-twenty-year shelf life.  The Close Combat Missile System (CCMS) Program 
Office has received approval from the Department of the Army to enter into contracts for 
support of both the ITAS and Javelin systems.  ITAS has an existing contract for 
maintenance and supply efforts with the prime developer.  Javelin is in the planning stage 
and envisions a teaming arrangement between the prime and the Government depot.  The 
contract award is to the prime developer who, in turn, contracts with the depot for the 
maintenance activities.  The prime is responsible for the supply of spares and repair parts, 




2. Why Does LCCS Interest the Department of Defense and the Army? 
Contracting for performance-based logistics (PBL) allows the contractor to 
provide a flexible solution regarding a system’s performance.  Performance-based 
specifications were implemented to allow flexible development and production for a set 
of requirements and goals.  PBL continues the concept through the support and 
maintenance of the system. 
Another aspect is the manpower reductions attributed to base realignment and 
closures and an aging workforce.  Both tend to drive the Defense Department to third 
party logistics procurement efforts.  The DOD leadership is pushing logistics reform in an 
attempt to lower the pressure on the Operations and Maintenance Appropriation (OMA).  
The Navy has used this form of support for years, and leads all of the Services in 
implementing PBL.  The Air Force ranks second, with the Army coming in last.  (Shea, 
2002) 
The Defense Department anticipates that the use of PBL can bring higher levels 
of system readiness via more efficient management and direct accountability.  The 2001 
QDR advocated PBL as a means to gain warfighter-focused sustainment of weapon 
systems.  Use of PBL can eliminate non-value-added steps within the supply chain if 
coupled with modern business systems and appropriate metrics to measure performance. 
3. Does the System’s Life-Cycle Determine a Specific Contract Method? 
The weapon system’s program phase demonstrates a relationship between 
program maturity and risks.  While the system’s phase in the life-cycle can mandate the 
type of funds used, it does not necessarily determine a specific contract method.  The 
amount of risk associated with the effort plays a larger role in determining the contract 
type.  Cost-plus contracts place the majority of the risk on the Government by allowing 
the contractor to incur costs above the negotiated contract price.  Negotiating a target and 
ceiling price distributes the risks more equitably between the Government and contractor, 
while limiting the Government’s liability. 
The type of funding also drives the contracting method.  Research and 
Development funding usage occurs when weapon system performance is improved.  It 
also corresponds to a higher risk since the potential outcome cannot be predicted with 
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certainty.  Procurement dollars fund Interim Contractor Support (ICS) efforts occurring 
prior to organic support capability implementation.  The risk during this period is more 
easily defined and not as high as during a developmental effort.  OMA funds typical 
support and maintenance activities for weapon systems along with the Defense Working 
Capital Fund (DWCF).  OMA funds are fragmented and do not have a single manager, 
which makes it difficult to resource contractual efforts as large as weapon system 
support.  Because of this, the Army is implementing measures to redirect funding for 
LCCS activities to program managers.   
The DWCF funds the infrastructure associated with supporting systems and once 
a system enters this domain, it is extremely difficult to remove.  Departing the DWCF 
imposes a re-allotment of costs across the remaining participants that result in increased 
costs across those associated systems. 
4. What Does the Army Contract for in This Environment?   
The Army wants a defined package of the logistics support functions required to 
maintain the readiness and operational capability of a system or subsystem.  The package 
includes materiel management, distribution, technical data management, maintenance, 
training, cataloging, configuration management, engineering support, repair parts 
management, failure reporting and analysis, and most importantly, reliability growth.  All 
items must contribute to the warfighter’s mission capability.  Strategy updates and re-
evaluations must occur every five years during the system/subsystem’s life-cycle.  More 
frequent updates may occur depending upon the pace of technology.  The Defense 
Department encourages program managers to use organic, commercial, and partnering 
arrangements to fulfill their support requirements.  Teaming is encouraged wherever 
possible within existing legal constraints. 
To measure the performance of the contracted effort, the program manager 
balances readiness and operational objectives against cost and schedule constraints.  
Examples of metrics include system availability, logistics footprint, overall system 
readiness levels, and mission reliability.  Linking the metrics to warfighter measures of 
performance and reporting systems is preferred.  It is important to clearly delineate those 
areas and factors affecting performance that reside outside the contractor’s control. 
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A final area of concern is the use of contractors on the battlefield.  The Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 augmented the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) to cover contractors under conditions other than declared war.  The 
accompanying contracted workforce is now subject to the military legal system and 
Federal law for criminal conduct and actions occurring outside the United States.  
(Gutierrez, 2001) 
5. What Contractor Incentives Are Possible to Improve Performance? 
Incentive and Award fees provide possible means for enhancing contractor 
performance.  Either type promotes operational availability through increased reliability, 
reduced repair and/or turn-around-times, better distribution times, or any means deemed 
to be effective.  The ITAS contract includes both positive and negative incentives to 
improve operational availability.  Penalties exist for decreased performance in the form 
of increasing contractor-funded spares and repair parts.  The outcome is an increased 
reliability requiring fewer spares and thus increasing profit. 
6. What Legal Ramifications Exist Regarding LCCS?   
United States Code:  Title 10, Chapter 146 (located at 
http://uscode.house.gove/title_10.htm) provides extensive guidance and legal constraints 
associated with LCCS.  The Sections and their terminology are:   
Section 2460:  Definition of depot-level maintenance and repair 
Section 2461:  Commercial or industrial type functions (required studies and 
reports before conversion to contractor performance) 
Section 2462:  Contracting for certain supplies and services required when cost is 
lower 
Section 2463:  Collection and retention of cost information data on converted 
services and functions 
Section 2464:  Core logistics capabilities 
Section 2465:  Prohibition on contracts for performance of firefighting or security 
guard functions 
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Section 2466:  Limitations on the performance of depot-level maintenance of 
materiel 
Section 2467:  Cost comparisons (inclusion of retirements costs; consultation with 
employees; waiver of comparison) 
Section 2468:  Military installations (authority of base commanders over 
contracting for commercial activities) 
Section 2469:  Contracts to perform workloads previously performed by depot-
level activities of the Department of Defense (competition 
requirement) 
Section 2469a: Use of competitive procedures in contracting for performance of 
depot-level maintenance and repair workloads formerly performed 
at certain military installations 
Section 2470:  Depot-level activities of the Department of Defense (authority to 
compete for maintenance and repair workloads of other federal 
agencies) 
Section 2472:  Management of depot employees 
Section 2473:  Procurements from the small arms production industrial base 











The following recommendations are made based upon the analysis of information 
reviewed for this thesis and the questions/concerns that arose with the ITAS and Javelin 
ventures.  The funding issue concerning both what type and how to resource the effort, is 
an important impediment to LCCS. 
1. The PM Should Be the Focal Point for OMA Funding and 
Expenditures 
Currently, the Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) provides funding for LCCS 
activities.  OPTEMPO dollars normally go to the organizational units for operational 
requirements (one of which is equipment support).  Since OMA expenditures are not 
tracked by system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine if the units are short-
changed by the diversion of these monies from their budget requests.  The PM now has 
the responsibility for defending their system’s financial resourcing requests for OMA 
funds, but the release and expenditure of that money is still not within his purview.  
Assigning accountability to the PM for expenditures would allow the necessary auditing 
of those funds by system to determine the actual support costs and associated impacts. 
2.   An Annual Versus Quarterly Release of LCCS OMA Funding is 
Needed 
Receiving funding on a quarterly basis impedes the contractor’s ability to make 
long-range plans without risk.  Contract work stoppages occur when funding is not 
obligated to a contract at specific time frames.  Funding delays could result in contractor 
lay-offs and loss of support at critical times.  Annual funding, coinciding with the 
Congressional appropriation of resources, greatly reduces the likelihood of adverse 
impacts. 
3.   The PM Needs Guidance on Determining the Potential Impact to 
Depots for the Work Share Loss Relative to LCCS 
The PM must prepare a benefit analysis that takes into consideration the loss of 
depot work share efforts as a part of the quantitative study.  The Apache PVS study 
reaped the benefits of the Inspector General (IG), Army Audit Agency (AAA), and GAO 
assistance in determining these costs.  The PM of medium and smaller programs does not 
have this advantage and must rely upon comparisons to Apache when developing an 
estimate.  Not all systems are as complex as the Apache system and an analogy to it may 
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not apply.  The PEO, Tactical Missiles has requested the Army Cost and Economic 
Analysis Center to develop guidelines for PM staffs’ use when developing the benefit 
analysis. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Case Study of ITAS or Javelin System 
Since both systems have either contracted for life-cycle logistics support, or are in 
that process, propose case studies of each system for suitability and/or opportunities for 
improvements relative to other programs. 
2. Application of Warranties Within LCCS 
Many warranty variations provide a form of life-cycle support for weapon 
systems.  Propose a study on the types and applicability to weapon systems. 
3. Government and Contractor Teaming Arrangements 
Propose a study regarding Government and contractor teaming arrangements to 
determine what problems and/or benefits exist when the Government is a sub-vendor. 
4. Application of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 
Propose a study of the application of the MEJA within the organizational level of 
support.  Study to include the aspects of the Contracting Officer Representative and 
directing contractor personnel. 
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